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EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE
ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM
Law enforcement officers frequently arrest and illegally detain suspects
apart from friends or counsel and, by protracted questioning, secure confes-
sions. State courts agree that such confessions are admissible under common
law evidence principles only if voluntary or trustworthy., Though there is
dispute as to which term expresses the proper rationale, the theory is normally
cast aside in favor of a commonly used rule of thumb test: Was the confes-
sion secured by threats, promises, fear, or hope ?2 The result is that the con-
fession is rarely excluded,' but the admission of a confession on these com-
mon law principles may be a violation of constitutional rights. Decisions of
the United States Supreme Court within the last decade have declared that
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment limits the use of
confessions obtained by abusive police methods as a basis for a criminal con-
viction.4 Originally, there was verbal agreement that due process was violated
where the undisputed facts disclosed the confession to be coerced.5 This ver-
bal rubric later proved itself a flexible basis for either a majority or minority
opinion,6 and was abandoned by the majority of the Court in three recent cases.
In one of these cases, Watts, arrested for criminal assault, was taken into
custody early Wednesday afternoon. Later in the day, he was suspected of
committing a sex murder, the crime for which he was subsequently tried and
1. Wigmore states that the controlling principle should be trustworthiness. 3 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 851 (3d ed. 1940). For an excellent discussion of the merits of the tAvo
views, see McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Lazo of Evidence, 17 TEX. L. REV.
447, 452-457 (1938).
2. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 825.
3. 3 WIG1ORE, EVIDENCE § 851.
4. The first two cases were Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936) and Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940).
5. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219
(1941). However, in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944), where the defendant
had been questioned under bright lights for 36 hours, without friends or counsel, Mr.
Justice Black, for the majority, after stating that the facts involved coercion or compul-
sion, stated that
We think a situation such as that here shown by uncontradicted evidence
is so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with
the possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom its full
coercive force is brought to bear.
Id. at 154 (Italics supplied). Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, disapproved the notion that
the confession should be excluded because the methods used in securing the confession
were merely "inherently coercive." Id. at 156.
6. Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945) and Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S.
596 (1944).
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convicted.7  By the following Tuesday morning, Watts gave a confession
satisfactory to police. During the six days, he was not arraigned as required
by Indiana law. He was held in the county jail, where his first two days were
spent in a cell known by fellow prisoners as the "hole," which had only a floor
on which to sit and sleep. Excepting Sunday and a late start the first night,
Watts was moved to the State Police Headquarters each night for questioning.
These sessions were conducted by six or eight officers in relays, running from
eight to nine hours a night, beginning at about 6 p. m. During the day, Watts
experienced intermittent questioning. On three afternoons, he was driven
about town in the hope of eliciting information from him. At no time was
Watts advised that he could remain silent. Nor did he see family, friends, or
counsel. With these as undisputed facts, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the conviction. Watts v. Indiana, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347 (1949).8
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in the opinion of the Court, characterized the
facts as involving "a calculated endeavor to secure a confession through the
pressure of unrelenting interrogation," and declared that the
very relentlessness of such interrogation implies that it is better for
the prisoner to answer than to persist in the refusal of disclosure
which is his constitutional right. To turn the detention of an accused
into a process of wrenching from him evidence which could not be
extorted in open court with all its safeguards, is so grave an abuse
of the power of arrest as to offend the procedural standards of due
process. This is so because it violates the underlying principle in our
7. Watts v. State, 82 N. E.2d 846 (Ind. 1948).
8. In the two companion cases, the Court seems to go further on the facts in
Turner v. Pennsylvania than it goes in the Watts case. Here, Turner was arrested with-
out warrant on the morning of June 3, 1946. On this day, Turner was questioned three
hours during the afternoon from 8 p.m. to 11 p.m. He was questioned four hours on
June 4, four hours on June 5, and six hours on June 6. On June 7, Turner was questioned
three hours during the afternoon and from "late in the day" until he confessed at 11
p. m. The next day he was given a preliminary hearing before a committing magistrate-
the Pennsylvania laws requiring prompt production before a magistrate had been vio-
lated. For the most part, the questioning experienced by Turner was carried on by one
or several officers, depending upon whether the "police officers interested in the investi-
gation had any free time." Turner was not permitted to see relatives, friends, or counsel;
nor warned of his "Constitutional rights." The Court reversed his first-degree murder
conviction. 69 Sup. Ct. 1352 (1949).
In the other case, Harris was taken into custody in Nashville, by Tennessee officers
at the request of South Carolina officers, on Friday, July 12, 1946, and was delivered to
a South Carolina county jail on Sunday afternoon. On Monday afternoon, Harris learned
for the first time, while he was being briefly questioned, that he was suspected for
murder. On Monday night, Harris was questioned a considerable time. On Tuesday, he
was questioned from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. and from 6:00 p.m. until 1 a.m. On Wednes-
day afternoon, he was questioned four hours. In a session beginning Wednesday at 6:30
p.m. and ending at 12:00 p.m., the sheriff threatened to arrest Harris's mother for
handling stolen property, whereupon Harris confessed. He was denied the presence of
friends or counsel. He was not given a preliminary hearing. Most of the above ques-
tioning involved relay questioning in a small room carried on by State officers. Harris
was not advised on any "Constitutional rights." The Court reversed hi rnprder con-
viction. Harris v. South Carolina, 69 Sup. Ct. 1354 (1949),
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enforcement of criminal law. Ours is the accusatorial as opposed
to the inquisitorial system. 9
By these words, Mr. Justice Frankfurter condemns relentless interrogation or
sustained pressure which effectively destroys the constitutional right to re-
main silent.'"
The new doctrine set forth in the Frankfurter opinion is not unheralded.
Before 1945 the Court had disagreed only on whether the confession had to
be actually coerced, or whether it was sufficient that the circumstances were
inherently coercive." But in his concurring opinion in Malinski v. New
York, 12 Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed entirely new notions. In setting
forth the view that the Fourteenth Amendment is not rigid in scope and that
it is illuminated for the most part by history and the problems of government
with which it is concerned, Mr. Justice Frankfurter found the broad question
in each case to be whether the state action offends fundamental principles of
fairness and justice. Application of this broad standard, he stated in his
concurrence in Haley v. Ohio,"- invites a judgment reflecting the feelings of
society, and he finds the reports of the Wickersham Committee and state
legislation declaring the police practices involved illegal to be evidence of
these feelings.'" Due process does not turn on a mathematical determination
of whether a confession is voluntary or coerced; the rationale of the previous
cases are not controlling."5
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in the Watts case, would reverse any
state criminal conviction in which a confession obtained during a period of
illegal detention was introduced at the trial. 6 While this has been the rule
9. Watts v. Indiana, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1350 (1949).
10. Under our system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the
accused not out of his own mouth. It must establish its case, not by interrogation of the
accused even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through
skillful investigation. . . . Protracted, systematic and uncontrolled subjection of an
accused to interrogation by the police for the purpose of eliciting disclosures or confes-
sions is subversive of the accusatorial system. Ibid.
11. See note 5 supra.
12. 324 U. S. 401, 412 (1945).
13. 332 U. S. 596, 601 (1948).
14. Id. at 605, 606; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 418, 419 (1945). The Eng-
lish practice and the recommendations of the Wickersham Committee are discussed
infra at pp. 81-84.
15. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 601, 602 (1948).
16. We should condemn "any confession obtained during the period of illegal de-
tention." Watts v. Indiana, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1351 (1949). The Court had previously
stated that a denial of a prompt preliminary examination is merely a "fact for considera-
tion on an allegation that a confession used at the trial was coerced." Lyons v. Okla-
homa, 322 U, S. 596, 597 n.1 (1944).
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in the federal courts, 17 Mr. Justice Douglas, for the first time on the part of
the Court, clearly urges its application to state courts. His Watts concurrence
was foreshadowed by a dictum in his majority opinion in Haley v. Ohio:
"The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the police from using the private,
secret custody of either man or child as a device for wringing confessions
from them.""'
With the Watts case, five distinct views now exist on the Court as to
confessions obtained through prolonged questioning of a person illegally
detained.
Mr. Justice Douglas would not admit any confession secured during a
period of illegal detention. The other Justices are not willing to forbid
illegal detention for the purpose of questioning. The Chief Justice. Mr.
Justice Reed, and Mr. Justice Burton state that they will find a confession
inadmissible if it clearly appears from the undisputed facts to be coerced. "
Mr. Justice Black also identifies the due process question with the con-
cept of coercion," but is much more prone to find coercion in a given set of
facts."' Mr. Justice Frankfurter easily finds a denial of due process under
a standard which tolerates' questioning until it becomes relentless questioning
destructive of the "right" to remain silent. Mr. Justice Jackson believes the
17. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943), the Court in exercising its
reviewing power over the federal courts, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, de-
clared a confession secured in violation of the federal arraignment statutes inadmissible
in federal courts. This has remained the general federal rule. United States v. Upshaw,
335 U. S. 410 (1949). Compare United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65 (1944) and
Garner v. United States, 174 F.2d 499 (1949), cert. denied, 69 Sup. Ct. 1502 (1949). See
Inbau, Legal Pitfalls to Avoid in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 J. CRiAl. L. 211 (1949).
The only mention made of the McNabb case in the Watts case, however, concedes
that the Supreme Court has no similar corrective pover over thie states though the due
process clause "potentially" gives wide supervision by way of reviewing power. 69 Sup.
Ct. 1347, 1348 n. 1 (1949).
There are good reasons why the due process clause should not be characterized to
result in such a strict rule. See infra, pp. 82-84. The best use of the McNabb rule
would seem to be to prove its achievement of effective law enforcement. Though the
McNabb case has been doubted in some states as being capable of achieving effective law
enforcement, a noteworthy example of following the McNabb rule in preference to the
common law is State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 15 N. W.2d 285 (1944).
18. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 601 (1948).
19. They dissent without opinion in the Watts case, and thus presumably adhere to
their previously expressed views. See Mr. Justice Burton, with whom the Chief Justice,
Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Jackson concur, dissenting in Haley v. Ohio, 332
U. S. 596, 607 (1948). See Mr. Justice Reed in Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944),
and in Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 434 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
20. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the judgment of the Court in the Watts case on
the authority of Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) and Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U. S. 143 (1944). See note 5 supra.
21. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1949); Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401
(1945) ; Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S.
143 (1944).
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test should be predicated on the trustworthiness of the confession,22 which
presumably would mean that due process would be easily satisfied.
Before formulating a precise definition of what constitutes an admissible
confession there must be further consideration of the social problems involved,
e.g., the reasons for the illegal detention and questioning procedures. Con-
tinuous secret questioning is by far the most frequently used "third-degree"
practice,23 and usually occurs subsequent to the arrest and prior to presenta-
tion before a magistrate for preliminary examination. 24 To exclude arbitrarily
all confessions obtained during a period of illegal detention would doubtless
eliminate such practices. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court would go this
far, and the more probable issue seems to be: How much questioning of an
illegally detained suspect shall be permitted in securing a confession? Law
enforcement officers insist that effective criminal law administration neces-
sitates present practices, 2  and warn that the Supreme Court must not so con-
strue the Constitution as to deter this effectiveness. Apparently in agreement
with this notion is Mr. Justice Jackson, who, disagreeing with the reasoning
of the Court in Watts, noted that two-thirds of murders go unsolved, and
argued that adherence to Mr. Justice Douglas' views would exclude practically
22. Watts v. Indiana, 60 Sup. Ct. 1357, 1358 (concurring in the Watts and dissent-
ing in the Turner and Harris cases). The only explanation for the fact that Mr. Justice
Jackson concurred in the Watts case is found in his statement: "If the opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in the Watts case were based solely on the State's admissions as to
the treatment of Watts, I should not disagree." Ibid.
23. That "third-degree" exists is beyond question. See authorities cited in Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 150, n. 5, 152, n. 8 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U. S. 227, 238, n. 11, 240, n. 15 (1940). Probably the most extensive investigation
ever made on the existence of the "third-degree" in the United States was that completed
in 1931 by the Wickersham Committee appointed by President Hoover. Their scope of
investigation included 80 books and articles, opinions handed down in 106 appellate courts,
a field study of 15 American cities, and questionnaires sent to various sources. "Third-
degree" is practiced by policemen, detectives, and prosecutors, both against suspects and
witnesses, men and women, young and old, against members of minority races as well as
others, against persons of various mentality, usually against persons without influence,
and usually used in more serious felonies, often without regard to whether the victim
has a criminal record. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT,
REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 157-172 (1931). Clearly, prolonged or
protracted questioning is practiced more frequently than other "third-degree" methods.
Generally it is practiced while the suspect is without relatives, friends, or counsel. Id. at
153, 154, 169. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 851(a) (3d ed. supp. 1947).
24. Ibid.
25. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 38-44, 174-180 (1931). See an address by
Honorable Robert P. Butler, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, 18
CONN. BAR J. 166 (1944); Comment by Professor Waite, 43 Micir. L. REV. 679 (1944)
(note, especially, the letter from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover at 639-691) ; Inbau, The Confes-
sion Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 442, 447-451 (1948).
The latter author in his most recent article asserts that there is necessity for specially
selected and trained police interrogators "to modify current interrogation methods to
the extent [now] demanded for Supreme Court approval." Inbau, Legal Pitfalls To
Avoid in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 J. CRIM. L. 211, 216 (1949).
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all confessions. Though the opinion of the Court is less extreme than Mr.
Justice Douglas' concurrence, Mr. justice Jackson still warns that the serious-
ness of the Court's judgment is that the Court condemns relentless question-
ing, but suggests no other method of solving these murders.26
But that which Mr. Justice Jackson infers cannot be done has already
been done and indicates that continuous questioning during illegal detention
is not a requisite to effective law enforcement. Indeed, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter and Mr. Justice Black have considered the Wickersham Committee re-
ports and the experiences of the British Empire as sufficient proof that ef-
fective law enforcement does not compel the police practices utilized in the
cases reviewed.
2 7
In England, the police actually practice prompt presentation of arrested
persons before a magistrate .2  During the short time they hold a prisoner
before presentation, they cannot in any practical sense question the suspects
and secure confessions which will be admissible in evidence. 29 It is significant
26. Watts v. Indiana, 69 Sup. Ct. 1357 (1949).
27. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in the Malinski and Haley cases, supra
notes 12, 13, 14. In reference to the English practice, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said:
* there can be no doubt... that the practices such as this record reveals
are not there [England] tolerated. . . . Whatever differences there be
between the situations in England and in this country in the task of law
enforcement, it is intolerable to suggest that we cannot have effective
law enforcement without conduct such as this record spreads before us.
Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 419 (1945) (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice
Frankfurter emphasized these very same considerations in writing the opinion of the
Court in McNabb v. United States, supra note 17.
Mr. Justice Black has made extended citation to the Reports of the Wickersham
Committee and similar works. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 159 n. 5, 152 n.
8 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 238 n. 11, 240 n. 15 (1940). In the
Chambers case, his opinion repudiates the argument made by the state officers to the
effect that effective law enforcement demanded the practices they used. Id. at 240. But
Mr. Justice Black has adhered to the views expressed in note 5 supra.
28. Summary Jurisdiction Act, 42 and 43 VICT. c. 49, § 38 -(1879). REPORT OF THE
ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURE 57 (1929) :
We conceive it to be a principle inherent in the English law that no
person shall be deprived of his liberty except by a magistrate or court.
Admittedly there is the power of arrest, whether by the police or a mem-
ber of the public, but this power of arrest is only with a view to the
production of a prisoner before a magistrate.
29. In 1912, the Home Secretary requested the Judges of the King's Bench to an-
nounce some rules to be followed by police officers in questioning suspects and arrested
persons. The judges replied with several rules, and have subsequently added others.
[1918] 1 K. B. 531, 539; 3 WIGM0RE, EVIDENCE § 846; PHIPSON, EVIDENCE 251, 252 (8th
ed. 1942). Rules (3)'and (4), as explained in a circular issued by the Home Secretary
on June 24, 1930 (536053/29) with the approval of the Judges, mean that persons in cus-
tody of police (arrested persons) must be cautioned before they may volunteer a state-
ment. But as explained, this does not mean police are authorized by these rules to ques-
tion or examine the person in custody, and any answer to such a question will not be
admitted in evidence. PHn'soN, EVIDENcE 252 (8th ed. 1942). It is clear, however, that
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that, on trial, the judge may comment on the refusal of the accused to answer
questions during his preliminary examination before the magistrate.30 Despite
these restrictions on detaining persons for questioning, the English practice is
renowned for effective enforcement of its criminal laws." And in Scotland,
police are prohibited from questioning arrested persons.32  In the United
States, at the time of the Wickersham Committee report, the city of Boston
had long enjoyed effective law enforcement despite, or perhaps as a result of,
a requirement of prompt arraignment. 33
These instances do not demonstrate that substantial prohibition of police
questioning and the requirement of prompt arraignment can be followed
these rules are not considered the equivalent of a decided case. PHIPSON, EVIDENCE 251
(8th ed. 1942).
For information concerning the English practice, see REPORT OF THE ROYAL COM.
MISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURE (1929); McCormick, Some Problems and
Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEX. L. REV. 239, 254-258 (1946)
Prel. Draft, FED. R. CRIM. P. 15, 16 (1943); Note, 53 YALE L. J. 758, 768 (1944).
30. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272.
31. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURE 11 (1929)
(statistics on undetected crime in England) ; McCormick, Some Problems and Develop-
ments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEX. L. REV. 239, 276 (1946). "Despite
the fact that English criminal justice has serious inadequacies and lags behind some of our
penological advances, it is undeniable that on the whole it is much more effective than
ours." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401,
419 (1945).
32. KEEDY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND 15, 16 (1943).
33. Of the several cities studied by the Wickersham Committee, "third-degree" was
least existent in Boston, although not non-existent. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 104
(1931). The Boston high standards began in 1906 with Commissioner Stephen O'Meara,
who insisted that police were to maintain order and keep the law, not break the law. Id.
at 106. Superintendent Michael Crowley, appointed in 1915, felt it was "stupid" to con-
tend that illegal practices were necessary to police work. Ibid. Prompt investigation was
the key word. Id. at 105. The judges (before whom preliminary hearing was had) were
politically independent of the police department. Id. at 107. "Suspicion" arrests were
legal in Boston, thus obviating any practical necessity for having a confession before tak-
ing the arrested person before a magistrate. Id. at 108. This is a fact of considerable
importance as illustrated by the Turner case [see note 8 supra], in which the trial judge,
in reply to Turner's argument that the jury consider the fact of illegal detention in deter-
mining whether his confession was "voluntary" told the jury that it was "common sense
'not to send them [suspects] to the magistrate before you have sufficient information to
hold an alleged culprit for the Grand Jury.'" Turner v. Pennsylvania, 69 Sup. Ct. 1352,
1353 (1949). The Boston police had somewhat more than a day to have the prisoner taken
before a court (an arrested person normally spent no more than one night with the police).
Immediately upon arraignment, the control of the police over the arrested person ended.
He was put in the custody of the sheriff or went out on bail, and the sheriff had little
motive for abusing prisoners. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND EN-
FORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 109 (1931).
However, prompt production before a magistrate is not of itself a guarantee against
"third-degree" practices. In San Francisco, arrested persons were as a matter of practice
taken before the magistrate the morning following their arrest, but unlike in Boston, the
suspects were returned to the police jail, often having had bail refused, where "third-
degree" could be practiced in earnest. This illustrates that the above particular circum-
stances under which Boston operated probably all contributed a good deal to their
success. Id. at 148.
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everywhere, however, because the effectiveness of criminal administration in
a particular locality is dependent a good deal upon local circumstances, such
as a high regard in the community for civil liberties demanding police officers
to observe high standards. 4 Particularly is this attitude evident in England."'
Further, England, Scotland, and Boston have probably never been infested
with criminal gangs simildr to those faced in New York and Chicago.
3 6
These reasons may have been responsible for the belief of the reporters
for the Wickersham Committee that the problem is essentially one for local
solution.3 7  But the Commission took a different view from that of its re-
porters,3 s and advocated
that every person arrested charged with crime should be forthwith
taken before a magistrate, advised of the charge against him, given
34. NATIONAL CoMMIssIoN ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORi
ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEIMENT 259 (1931) ; McCormick, Some Problems and
Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEX. L. REV. 239 (1946). See note
35 infra.
35. At the time the Wickersham Committee made its report, only one modern English
case showed any evidence of "third-degree" practices-the highly publicized case of Miss
Savidge (not judicially reported). See INQUIRY IN REGARD TO THE INTERROGATION BY
POLICE OFM MISS SAVIDGE: REPORT OF THE TRIBUNAL APPOINTED UNDER THE TRIBUNALS
OF INQUIRY (EVIDENCE) ACT (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1928, Cmd. 3147). In
1928, Miss Savidge and Sir Leo Money were arrested by two constables while sitting
on a bench in Hyde Park. The magistrate dismissed the charge of having behaved in the
park in a manner offending public decency. The director of prosecutions later con-
sidered prosecuting the two constables, this being a prosecution which would not succeed
if Miss Savidge could not stand cross-examination as to her character and reputation.
Miss Savidge was asked to come to Scotland Yard. She was interrogated there by the
Chief Inspector (and a sergeant) for four hours. The Chief Inspector drove her home,
and had friendly conversation with her mother; Miss Savidge gave no indications of being
tired. However, a member of the House of Commons learned of the matter, and as a
result the Home Secretary appointed a tribunal to investigate the incident. Though it
was never determined whether Miss Savidge's allegations were true (to the effect that
the Chief Inspector's questions implied lack of chastity, and that the Chief Inspector
attempted to reenact the park bench incident), nevertheless, criticism was directed at the
police, and as a result a Royal Commission of eight members was appointed to investigate
the entire field of police procedure. The product of the Royal Commission is the English
equivalent of the report of the Wickersham Committee in this country. See note 29 subra.
The Savidge case does not involve what is normally thought of as constituting "third-
degree" in this country, but indicates the sensitiveness of the English people to police
questioning, and the "high standards of conduct exacted by Englishmen of the police."
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESS-
NESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 259 (1931).
36. There seems a definite contrast between the "rackets" or "gangs" existing in
Boston as compared to Chicago or New York City. Id. at 106 (Boston), 83-102 (New
York City), and 123-137 (Chicago). Likewise, it is asserted that England has less
organized crime than such areas as New York or Chicago. McCormick, Some Problems
and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEX. L. REv. 239, 276 (1946).
37. NATIONAL CoMmiSSIoN ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 151, 191 (1931).
38. The reporters (consultants) consisted of Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., Walter H. Pol-
lak, and Carl S. Stern. Having made their research, they submitted a report to the Com-
mission, which consisted of 11 members, of which George W. Wickersham-was Chairman.
Id. at 10, 13.
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the right to have counsel and then interrogated by the magistrate.
His answers should be recorded and should be admissible in evi-
dence against him in all subsequent proceedings. If he chooses not
to answer, it should be permissible for counsel for the prosecution
and for the defense, as well for the trial judge, to comment on his
refusal.39
This proposal asserts that the illegal detention practices which have led to
grave abuses4" are partially induced by the privilege of the accused to remain
silent in court and on preliminary examination as well as the further guarantee
that such silence may not be the basis of any unfavorable inference upon trial.4 1
Police officers contend that they are consequently forced to question the
suspect at a place where the accused may not remain silent. Most proponents
of the view of the Commission believe it will lead to effective law enforcement,
in that it will provide a legal means permitting more effective questioning than
that now provided if an inference will be permitted from the accused's si-
lence.4 2  Constitutional amendment-a ponderous process-would probably
be necessary to sanction such an inference in many states.43
It seems unwise for the Court to exclude rigidly all confessions obtained
39. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 5 (1931). It differs from the Boston practice
in that police may not question arrested persons for a day or so before taking them before
a magistrate as was the Boston practice. See note 33 supra. It differs from the English
practice in that the English police have 24 hours in which to have an arrested person taken
before a magistrate. Summary Jurisdiction Act, 42 and 43 VICT. c. 49, § 38 (1879). But
of course the rules stated in note 29 mtpra are applicable during this period.
For arguments that a "reasonable" time should be allowed before police must take
a person before a magistrate, see authorities cited in McCormick, Some Problems and
Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEX. L. REV. 239, 274, 275 (1946).
40. Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J.
CRIM. L. 1014 (1934). Dean Pound was a member of the Wickersham Committee.
41. As to the various proceedings in which the protection of the privilege extends,
see: State v. Smith, 56 S. D. 238, 228 N. W. 240 (1929) ; State v. Wolfe, 64 S. D. 178,
266 N. W. 116 (1936) ; In re Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 620, 15 N. E.2d 662
(1938) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252; Comment, 37 MicH. L. REV. 777 (1939).
As to the inferences (and comment) permissible against the accused for claiming
the privilege, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272. Cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S.
46 (1947).
42. Allowance of comment and an inference based on the silence of an accused seems
necessary if the only means for questioning of persons after they are arrested is before
an examining magistrate. " NATIONAL COMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCE-
MENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 6, 342 (1931); Pound, supra
note 40; McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confes-
sions, 24 TEX. L. REV. 239, 277 (1946) ; Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-
A Remedy for Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932). Wigmore, however, argues
that there is no necessity in allowance of such an inference or comment, not only because
he believes that if we have the privilege against self-incrimination, we should have it
with all its logical incidents, but further because he believes it is a psychological truth that
every guilty person is almost always ready to confess as soon as arrested. 3 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 851.
43. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 6 (1931) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272.
RECENT CASES
during a period of illegal detention, because police needs vary with local cir-
cumstances and state laws. On the other hand, the position taken by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in the Watts case, though not formulated with definite-
ness,' seems to provide a reasonable basis for resolving the problem." When
dealing with the conflicting objectives of effective law enforcement and
preservation of our "accusatorial system," what is needed is not an arbitrary
decision for the sake of certainty, but a pragmatic solution premised upon
knowledge of the problems of criminal law administration.
44. As illustrative of favorable reaction by the state courts to the Watts case, see
State v. Cooper, 67 A.2d 298 (N. J. 1949) ; Suter v. State, 88 N. E2d 386 (Ind. 1949). In
the latter case, the defendant was held at police headquarters without warrant from
Saturday night until 10:30 Monday morning. During this time the defendant was al-
most constantly questioned and was not permitted to sleep or rest. He asked for his
attorney and father as soon as he was taken into headquarters. These requests were
denied. On Monday morning, the defendant's father and attorney were told by police
that they could not see the defendant until they had "completed their statements.' The
defendant signed the purported confession at 10:30 Monday morning. The Indiana
Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction, on the basis of the Watts case, be-
cause the confession was "a product of the sustained and unlawful pressure of the police."
Chief Justice Gilkison further stated that a confession is inadmissible in evidence if
secured in violation of an Indiana statute which, among other things, makes it unlawful
for a police officer to deprive a person under custody of ". . . necessary food or sleep for
the purpose of extorting from said person a confession." Id. at 391.
